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Introduction 
 
The estate tax plays an important and controversial role in many aspects of our 
society.  This paper focuses on one of the more important and more controversial 
aspects of the estate tax.  Namely, we examine the relationships between changes 
in the estate tax rate and estate tax exemption levels and aggregate charitable 
bequest giving using time series data.  During life, donors give for many reasons, 
which may or may not be affected by the tax deductibility (only about one-fourth 
of US households itemize their taxes, so for three-fourths, the price of giving a 
dollar is a dollar).  Likewise, the decision to give at death is motivated by many 
factors, including the tax implications for some, but it must be recalled that less 
than two percent of Americans pay any estate tax, and less than half of them pay 
anything that would be considered a meaningful tax (Rooney and Tempel, 2001).  
That said, for very large estates, the exemption levels and the estate tax rates can 
be a considerable factor in estate planning.   
 
Larger estates are much more likely to include a charitable bequest and to have a 
much larger bequest value.  In 2011, almost 15% of all estates worth $3.5 million 
or less included a charitable bequest, but estates worth between $10 million and 
$20 million were twice as likely to include a charitable bequest (30%) and estates 
worth $20 million or more were almost three times as likely (42%) (IRS data cited 
by Giving USA 2013).  Similarly, estates worth $3.5 million or less include less 
than 1% of the value of all bequests in 2011.  Estates between $5 million and $10 
million and $10 million and $20 million each had about 12% of the total value of 
bequest gifts.  More strikingly, those estates worth $20 million or more had 71% of 
the value of all charitable bequests that year (Giving USA 2013).   
 
According to Giving USA, charitable bequests are the most volatile component of 
charitable giving.  The volatility of bequest giving to total giving can be illustrated 
by looking at the ranges of percentage increase and decrease for both.  Over the 
last 40 years, bequest giving has grown as rapidly as a 37% increase in inflation-
adjusted dollars (1982) but has fallen by 38.5% (2009).  Total giving’s range in 
percentage changes is less than one-third of that for bequest giving growing from 
14% in 1997) to a 8% decline in 2009) (also in inflation-adjusted dollars, Giving 
USA, 2013).  Not only is bequest giving less consistent than other sources of 
giving or giving overall, Giving USA reports that whether bequest giving increases 
or decreases in any given year often depends on the size and the generosity of the 
two to ten largest estates in any given year.   
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Figure 1 depicts total charitable bequests (in billions of dollars) from 1982 through 
2012 and the changes in the key policy variables: the top estate tax rate (as a 
percentage) and the exemption levels (in units of $100,000).  A few key points 
emerge from this graph, which helps motivate the need for this paper.  First, from 
1982 to 1984, the top marginal estate tax rate dropped dramatically, 10 percentage 
points, and the exemption levels were increased dramatically as well, from 
$225,000 in 1982 to $325,000 in 1984 (nominal dollars).  By 2012, the top estate 
tax rate had decreased to 35%, while the nominal exemption level had increased to 
$512,000, although it was off from its $1 million dollar high in 2002 and 2003.  
During this time, there was a drop and then a dramatic increase in charitable 
bequests.  Economic theory would predict that the reduction in the top marginal tax 
rate and the increase in the exemption levels would both tend to lower the 
incentives to leave a charitable bequest, which is the initial reaction, but the overall 
trend is clearly marked by bequests growing rapidly, nearly doubling in real terms 
over the three decades from 1982 to 2012.  Bequests increased from about $12.4 
billion (2012 dollars) in 1982 to about $23.4 billion (in 2012 dollars) in 2012.   
 
Second, from 1984 through 2001, the top marginal tax rates were static at 55%, 
although the nominal value of exemption levels increased from $325,000 to 
$675,000, yet charitable bequests grew dramatically from start to stop points in 
real terms.  Moreover, there were large swings up and down in the dollars left in 
charitable bequests during this period.  Clearly, the public policy variables may 
have mattered, but they are not the only forces at work—and may not even be the 
major drivers of these changes.  
 
Third, in the decade from 2000 until 2010, by 2009, compared to their 2000 values, 
there was another dramatic reduction in the top marginal tax rate (another 10 
percentage points) and an even more dramatic increase in the exemption levels 
(namely, a 419 percent increase in the exemption levels even before the estate tax 
was temporarily eliminated in 2010).  Again, in theory, both of these trends would 
drive down bequest giving, yet the historical reality is that while still volatile, the 
trend was that charitable bequests increased during this period.   
 
Fourth, our political leaders failed to address the estate tax and exemption level 
questions for the year 2010 in a timely manner.  The folklore is as 2010 
approached and began, many high net worth households prepared multiple wills to 
cover various contingencies in case the politicians pursued one or more policy 
options.  The result was that the estate tax became zero in 2010 (so the exemption 
is irrelevant), but the estate tax rate was re-instated in 2011 at a much lower rate 
(another ten percentage point drop) and the exemption level was also increased 
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quite dramatically.  Theory would predict that these would both have negative 
ramifications for charitable bequest giving.  Just before these policies become 
actuality, charitable bequest gifts dropped precipitously (almost 40 percent in real 
terms, between 2008 and 2009). Ironically, the year the tax rate went to zero 
(2010), charitable bequests increased in real terms almost 20 percent from 2009 to 
2010.   
 
Fifth, in 2011, bequest giving actually increased somewhat, before falling a little in 
2012.  In 2012, exemption levels increased, but the tax rates stayed the same as in 
2011.  However, compared to 2010 when there was no tax nor any meaningful 
exemption level, the tax rates and exemption levels in 2011 and 2012 actually 
increased exponentially, which theory would predict would increase bequest 
giving.  Given the lead and lag times involved in creating and/or revising wills, and 
given that it is unclear whether most households viewed this as a reduction in the 
top marginal tax rate or an increase, it is difficult to discern what is the correct 
theoretical interpretation for this short period of time.   
 
Over the past thirty years, estate tax rates have trended downwards significantly 
(65 percent vs 35 percent or a 46 percent reduction) and the nominal values of the 
exemption levels have grown dramatically too ($225,000 vs. $5.12 million or a  
2,176 percent increase!) During these three decades, charitable bequest gifts, have 
more than doubled in real terms and increased by nearly five times in nominal 
terms.  There have also been tremendous swings up and down on a year to year 
basis, including a period in which inflation-adjusted bequests were nearly triple 
what they were at the start of the period and then declines rapidly as well just 
before the estate tax was eliminated briefly.  One can infer that the estate tax rate 
and the exemption levels may matter, but other factors also seem to be important in 
affecting how much Americans leave in their wills for charities. This paper will 
attempt to address these questions using time-series regression models, as well as 
simple graphs. 
 
Figure 2 delineates the same policy variables from Figure 1, namely the top estate 
tax rates (in percentages) and the exemption levels (in increments of $100,000).  It 
is different from Figure 1 by focusing on the share of wealth that is in the form of a 
charitable bequest both among all estates and those estates worth over $10 million 
in net worth.  From this graph, we discern a few conclusions.  First, the percentage 
of all wealth going to bequests is pretty stable year over year with some bumps up 
and down, and with a slight upward trend from 1982 through 2008.  There is a 
downdraft in 2009 followed by a relatively large spike up in 2010—precisely when 
there is no estate tax.  This suggests that the wealth effect of having more after-tax 
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estate wealth outweighed the negative price effects of eliminating the estate tax—
at least in this one abnormal year.   
 
Similarly, in reviewing the percentage of estate wealth going to charitable bequests 
among the estates of $10 million or more, we see greater year-to-year volatility, 
and an even bigger spike in 2010.  This volatility in other years seems to be 
unrelated to changes in tax rates or exemption levels, but in 2010, there appears to 
be a direct cause and effect.  High net worth households are sharing some of their 
windfall gains from the elimination of the estate tax with the rest of society in the 
form of charitable bequest gifts. 
 
Figure 3 has the same lines for the estate tax rates and exemption levels for 
comparison purposes, but it focuses on the share of estates with a charitable 
bequest among all estates and the share of estates with charitable bequests among 
estates worth $10 million or more.  Inspecting the graph, the percentage of estates 
with a charitable bequest seems to be largely unrelated to either the estate tax rates 
or the exemption levels—at least prior to 2000. The estate tax rate dropped 
dramatically in the early 1980’s and the exemption levels increased dramatically 
then.  we would expect both to have a negative effect on charitable bequest giving.  
However, the share of all estates with a bequest actually gained ground in this 
period and the share of estates greater than $10 million with a bequest lost ground.  
From the mid-1980’s through the early 200’s, both tax rates, exemption levels and 
the share of all estates and large estates with a bequest stayed pretty static.    The 
share of all estates with a bequest increased pretty dramatically from 2008 through 
2012—at exactly the same time that tax rates plummeted and exemptions grew.    
Among the high net worth households (estates worth $10 million or more), there is 
simply a mild downward trend in the percentage of these estates with a charitable 
bequest from 1998 through 2008 .  With the re-instatement of the estate tax in 
2011, we see a resurgence of the percentage of all estates, including high net worth 
estates, which have created a charitable bequest.   
 
 
Literature Review 
 
A growing body of literature exists on the relationship between estate tax 
and charitable giving. The scholarly interest in the topic might have been fueled by 
two developments. On the one hand, the charitable bequest deduction does not play 
as important role as it did in the past, because some developed countries recently 
significantly reduced (such as the United States) or abolished (such as Australia, 
Canada, Italy, and New Zealand) bequest taxes (Bertocchi 2011)1. On the other 
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hand, a considerable increase in the amount of charitable bequests may occur in the 
future as the Baby Boomers continue to age. Havens and Schervish (1999) estimate 
that $41 trillion will be transferred between 1998 and 2052 in the United States. 
James, Lauderdal., and Robb (2009)2 conducted an analysis of nationally 
representative 1996 and 2006 waves of the Health and Retirement Study using a 
sample of 41,965 Americans between 55 and 64 years old. They found that 
charitable estate planning was increasing steadily in this period (in absolute 
numbers and as a percentage of all planned estates) in large part due to higher 
levels of wealth, education, and childlessness. They concluded that this trend is 
likely to continue.  
Three strands of literature are relevant to the discussion about the role of 
estate tax in charitable giving: the studies identifying predictors of bequests in 
general, the studies examining motivations for charitable bequests, and the studies 
assessing tax price elasticity and wealth elasticity of charitable giving.  
 
Predictors of bequests in general 
 
A number of studies examined not-tax-related predictors for 
intergenerational distribution of wealth. For example, Menchik (1980)3 examined 
probate records for 1,050 estates in Connecticut from select years between 1931 
and 1946. He found that the amount of inheritance is divided equally between 
children regardless of birth order and gender, although sons are more likely to 
inherit owner-operated family businesses. Tomes (1981)4 analyzed a five percent 
random sample of estates (659 estates) probated in the Cleveland, Ohio, between 
1964 and 65 and found that bequests are “compensatory” in that high-income 
children inherit less than low-income children. Wilhelm (1996)5 examined a one-
percent random sample of 2,348 children’s federal estate tax returns from 1982 
merged with returns of their own and their beneficiaries from 1980 to 1982. He 
found that there is little evidence in support of the “compensatory” role of 
bequests, because children in most cases inherit equal amounts, because there is 
only a small compensatory effect in case of income inequality between siblings, 
and because low-income children do not inherit statistically significant higher 
amounts.  
 
Motivations for charitable bequests 
 
Relatively few studies attempted to identify personal motivations of 
decedents for charitable bequests. Chang, Okunade, and Kumar (1999)6 analyzed 
the data from the 1992 Gallup National Survey of Giving and Volunteering. They 
found that the predictors of charitable bequests include beliefs and attitudes. 
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McGranahan (2000)7 used historical analysis to examine 1,357 charitable bequests 
from seventeenth century Suffolk (in England) and concluded that individuals who 
are wealthier or religious or have fewer children are more likely to give to the 
poor. The results suggest that testators are motivated by the “warm glow” 
understood as altruism accompanied by the desire for the approval and approbation 
of others, especially by nonrelatives. James (2009a)8 examined a sample of 18,469 
Americans older than 50 years of age derived from the 1995-2006 Health and 
Retirement Study and found that there is a positive relationship between charitable 
estate planning and age, wealth, education, religious attendance, volunteering, 
charitable giving, and the absence of children or grandchildren. Wiepking, 
Madden, and McDonald (2010)9 examined a 2008 survey responses from over a 
thousand donors to six charitable organizations in Australia (where there is no 
estate tax). The analyses controlled for educational level, age, the charitable 
organization, and whether the respondent decided to leave a charitable bequest 
when preparing a will. The study found that the higher likelihood of leaving a 
bequest is predicted by a strong belief in the efficacy of charitable organization, by 
past giving behavior, and by having no children.  
Although taxes are not the most important predictor of donations, tax 
regulations (including tax rates, level of charitable deductions and other tax 
legislation) seem to be significant factors in determining the size and distribution 
of charitable giving (Clotfelter 2007)10. The National Committee on Planned 
Giving (2001)11 examined an initial sample of 170,000 US households and found 
that in making planned gifts (which include bequests) those with annual incomes 
of more than $74,000 were motivated by tax considerations as well as the need for 
longer-range planning.  
 
Tax price elasticity and wealth elasticity of charitable bequests 
 
A growing body of literature exists on the effects of estate taxes on 
charitable bequests. In general, the literature indicates that higher estate taxes are 
associated with larger charitable bequests as well as larger inter vivos charitable 
donations. Peloza and Steel (2005)12 conducted a meta-analysis using a sample of 
69 publications and concluded that giving is highly price elastic and that tax price 
elasticities for charitable donations in the form of bequests are higher than for 
donations in other forms. With a few notable exceptions most of current research is 
based on cross-sectional data and as such does not consider frequent changes in tax 
policy. McNees (1973)13 examined individual federal tax returns from 1957 and 
1959 and found that for millionaire estates, wealth and tax incentives were 
significant predictors of charitable bequests. Boskin (1976)14 examined federal tax 
estate data for years 1957 to 1959 and 1969. He found that predictors of the 
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propensity to leave charitable bequests include the donor’s labor income, savings, 
wealth and the tax rules. He estimated tax price elasticity of charitable bequests 
between -1.8 and -0.94 for years 1957 to 1959 and between -2.53 and -0.2 for 
1969. Thus, he concluded that estate tax charitable deduction is treasury efficient.  
Barthold and Plotnick, (1984)15 analyzed probate records of large 
Connecticut estates from the 1930s and 1940s. Their analysis is the first to 
consider cross-year variation in tax rules. Their results also constitute an exception 
because the study did not find significant relationship between estate tax rates and 
charitable bequests. Clotfelter (1985)16 examined federal estate tax returns of 
decedents for 1976 and estimated tax price elasticity of charitable bequests 
between -2.79 and -1.67. Joulfaian (1991)17 analyzed federal estate tax records for 
decedents in 1986 filed during the years 1986 through 1988 and found that 
charitable bequests are affected by wealth level and composition, marital status, 
gender, age, and taxes. He created two estimates for the tax price elasticity of 
charitable bequests at -3.0 and -0.7. Auten and Joulfaian (1996)18 analyzed 
matched income tax records from 1981 and 1982 for 5,585 wealthy parents and 
children. They found that children’s income and taxes affect the amount of 
charitable bequests. They calculated a tax price elasticity of bequests of -2.5.  
Joulfaian (2000)19 examined a dataset from estate tax returns of unmarried 
decedents in 1992 and assessed a tax price elasticity of bequests of -0.74 and a 
wealth elasticity of 1.54. Using similar specification, Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod 
(2003)20 examined a dataset of federal estate tax returns for deaths in selected years 
between 1924 and 1998. They calculated a tax price elasticity of bequests between 
-2.14 and -1.62 and a wealth elasticity of 1.32. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003) 
examined estate tax returns from 1921 to 1998 and found that the estate tax has a 
significant effect on charitable bequests. Joulfaian (2004) 21 examined data for 
intergenerational gift tax collections made between 1933 and 1998 and found that 
gifts by the wealthy are highly elastic with respect to taxes. The transitory price 
elasticity found is about -14, and the permanent elasticity was around -4, although 
this measurement is not precisely measured. Joulfaian (2005) examined data on the 
estates of widowed and unmarried decedents from 1976 to 1982. He estimated a 
tax price elasticity of -1.21 and wealth elasticity of 1.16. Moreover, he predicted 
that repealing the estate tax would decrease bequests by about 62 percent and 
predicted that repealing the charitable bequests’ deduction would decrease 
bequests by a third. Brunetti (2005)22 examined records of 5,650 estates filled in 
San Francisco County Superior Court between 1980 and 1982. He concluded that 
estate and inheritance taxes are significantly related to charitable bequests. For 
fillers of federal tax return, he predicted that a repeal of the federal estate tax would 
decrease charitable bequests by 1.98 to 7.74 percent of after tax wealth. For non-
fillers, the predicted amount would be between 2.09 and 4.38 percent. Hanke et al. 
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(2012)23 examined 900 probate records of the most generous decedents from 
Virginia and Louisiana for the years 2000–2005. They concluded that charitable 
bequest tax price elasticity of 0.8 or 0.9 thus concluding that charitable bequest 
deduction is not treasury efficient.  
A few studies enrich the discussion about treasury efficiency of charitable 
bequest deduction by considering compliance costs. For example, Henry Aaron 
and Alicia Munnell (1992) 24 suggest that the revenues generated by the tax do not 
exceed total compliance and administration costs. Moreover, some studies consider 
broader consequences of the repeal of estate tax in the United States (e.g., Rooney 
and Tempel 200125, Joulfaian 2009)26 and in other countries (e.g., Bellettini and 
Taddei 2009)27.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
We examine the statistical relationships between the key policy variables, relevant 
economic variables, and charitable bequest giving.  We use several different 
measurements of charitable bequest giving as the dependent variable.  First, we 
examine the total amount of charitable bequests given each year, as reported by 
Giving USA.  For this analysis, our time series data was available from 1954 until 
2012.  Second, we look at the share of the number of all estates with bequests and 
then the share of charitable bequests among all estate wealth.  For this analysis, the 
data was available from 1982 until 2011.    Finally, we repeat the analysis of the 
shares of estates and wealth among estates of $10 million or more.  The data for 
the estates with a bequest as a share of all estates and the share of estate wealth 
going to charitable bequests was provided by David Joulfaian (US Dept of 
Treasury.  It should be noted that neither Dr. Joulfaian nor Treasury commented on 
this analysis in any capacity. Nor did they try to influence our assessment of the 
results.       
 
Because there was no estate tax in 2010, there is no meaningful exemption level 
for this year.  To deal with this, we operationalize exemption levels in two distinct 
manners.  First, we treat exemption levels (inflation adjusted) as a continuous 
variable, excluding 2010, and we first difference this variable.  In other 
specifications, we create a set of dummy variables representing the exemption 
levels (inflation adjusted), including a dummy variable for no estate tax.  In all of 
the specifications that operationalize exemption levels as continuous, first 
differenced variables, we excluded data points involving 2010, since there was no 
estate tax during this year.  However, 2010 is included in the analysis when we 
analyze exemption levels as a set of dummy variables. 
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For each dependent variable, we conducted several models to examine the 
incremental effects of several dummies that test whether or not the Great 
Recession has an independent effect above and beyond the effects of several 
control variables that in theory would capture the business cycle effects.  We also 
tested all of the relevant policy variables that might affect the share of all estates 
with a charitable bequest and the share of all estate wealth that went to charitable 
bequests.  These policy variables included the following: changes in the top 
marginal estate tax rate (and its square), the estate tax exemption level, the 
absences of an estate tax, changes in the aggregate value of personal consumption 
in the US (and its square), changes in the S&P 500 Index (and its square), changes 
in the top marginal personal income tax rate (and its square), changes in GDP (and 
its lag), changes in aggregate corporate income (and its lag), and changes in 
corporate tax rate (and its lag).  Dummy variables for recessions prior to the Great 
Recession, the years of the Great Recession, and the years post Great Recession 
were also included, along with changes in the total number of estates. For each 
measurement of bequest giving, we start with a base model that includes the key 
variables that theory and prior research suggests should be included in each model.    
 
It should be noted that all monetary variables have been adjusted for inflation to 
capture underlying relationships between the variables, rather than the effects of 
inflation.  In addition, all of the variables, with the exception of the dummy 
variables, have been first-differenced both to isolate further the pure behavioral 
and structural relationships, but also to avoid the problems of autocorrelation that 
frequently plague time-series analyses.  To ease readability in the tables, we 
adjusted the following variables for analysis purposes for analysis on the bequest 
amounts (Table 2) prior to first differencing: S&P 500 and personal consumption 
(originally in billions of US dollars) were divided by 10, while the estate tax 
exemption variable (originally in US dollars) was divided by 1,000.  
 
For the analysis on the shares of total estates and total estates wealth (Tables 3, 4, 
5, and 6), we adjusted the following variables prior to first differencing: the estate 
tax exemption variable (originally in US dollars) was divided by 1,000,000, the 
S&P500 variable was divided by 1000; the number of estates was divided by 
10,000, personal consumption (originally in billions of US dollars), GDP, and 
corporate income (originally in billions of US dollars) were divided by 100.   
 
Summary statistics for the two sets of analyses in this paper, the bequest amount 
analysis and the share of estates and share of estate wealth analysis, are displayed 
in Table 1A and Table 1B, respectively, because the years of the time series for 
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these two analyses are distinct.  Of note may be the wide variation in tax rates and 
exemption levels during these decades! 
 
INSERT TABLES 1A AND 1B ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Results 
 
We briefly report the results of the significant variables for various measures of 
charitable bequest giving.  
 
Total Bequest Giving:  Table 2 uses total bequest giving as the dependent 
variable.  The first three specifications in Table 1 operationalize exemption levels 
as a first-differenced continuous variable (excluding 2010).  The last three 
specifications in the table treat the exemption levels as categorical variables.  
Personal consumption (differenced), which is our proxy for permanent income, and 
its squared value are always insignificant.  Our key measure of wealth, the S&P 
500 (differenced) and the square of the first differences of the S&P500 are always 
insignificant at traditional levels of significance.  However, in two of the 
specifications where exemption levels are operationalized as categorical variables, 
the first S&P 500 (differenced) is marginally significant (p <0.10).  Changes in the 
top marginal personal income tax rate are insignificant, as is the square of its 
difference.  Other recessions (prior to the Great Recession) are always 
insignificant.  The Great Recession dummy variable is never statistically 
significant.  When exemption levels are treated as dummy variables, the post-Great 
Recession dummy variable is positively associated with more bequest giving, 
although the coefficient is insignificant when exemption levels are treated as a 
continuous variable. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
We also include variables that we know affect corporate giving in case there were 
any indirect effects between variables that tend to predict corporate giving and 
charitable bequest giving.  We found that corporate income (differenced) and its 
square are insignificant, as are changes in the top marginal corporate tax rate 
(differenced) and its square.  Similarly, changes in the overall economy (Gross 
Domestic Product) (differenced and its square) had no effect on bequest giving. 
 
Not surprisingly, changes in the exemption levels and the tax rates on estates do 
impact charitable bequest giving. Consistent with the tax-price effect dominating 
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the wealth effect, an increase in the top marginal tax rate, which lowers the price of 
giving, is statistically significantly associated with an increase in bequest giving in 
specifications 4 and 5, when we do not include a binary variable for post-Great 
Recession and when exemption levels are treated as dummy variables.  However, 
the tax-price effect is insignificant when exemption levels are operationalized as a 
continuous variable (differenced).   The lag of the first differenced estate tax rate 
were positively associated with giving in specification 4 and 5, although it was 
only marginally significant in specification 5 (p < 0.10).   It is worth pointing out 
that in the one year with no estate tax (2010), bequest giving increased between 
$32 billion and $34 billion when we did not include a binary variable for post-
Great Recession years, which suggests that the wealth effect of eliminating the 
estate tax dominated the price effect of not having an estate tax in 2010, holding all 
other variables constant statistically.  Including a post Great Recession dummy 
variable in the model, which is coded as a one for years 2010 and 2011, drastically 
reduced the size of the effect and removed its significance, however.  Granted this 
was an unusual year, and it demonstrates that elimination of a tax may yield results 
that are different from years in which there are simply small changes in the top 
marginal tax rate.  
 
Also consistent with the tax-price effect dominating the wealth effect, as seen in 
the first three specifications in Table 2, increases in the exemption level, when it is 
treated as a continuous variable (differenced), are associated with small but 
significant declines in the amounts of charitable bequests.  As the exemption level 
increases, fewer estates are subject to any estate tax and a smaller share of the 
estate wealth of those subject to the estate tax is taxable, so we expect this to be 
negatively related to the amount of money left in charitable bequests.  Given the 
very small effect when measuring the exemption effect as a continuous variable, 
we also tested the exemption levels as a set of dichotomous variables based upon 
their inflation-adjusted values.  We found that relatively small exemption levels 
($500,000-$2,999,999) have no effect (compared to the omitted category of $0-
$499,999), but relatively large exemption levels ($3 million or more) are 
associated with fairly large reductions in charitable bequests. Estimates ranged 
from $10.3 billion to $25.3 billion depending on the model.  Overall, these models 
in Table 2, explained between 47 and 56 percent of the variation in the data.   
  
Estates with charitable bequests as a share of the number of all estates:  Table 
3 presents the results of our analysis on the relationship between various economic 
and policy variables and the share of all estates with a charitable bequest.  We 
tended to find that our policy-relevant variables were statistically significant, but 
there are mixed results compared to what one would expect based on economic 
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theory.  For example, increases in the top marginal tax rate (differenced) would be 
expected to increase the share of the number of estates with charitable bequest 
giving, because the cost of giving would go down.  We found that increases in the 
top marginal tax rate were significantly associated with a very small increase in the 
share of all estates with charitable bequest giving in the specifications that 
operationalized exemption levels as binary variables, with the exception of the 
specification that included a dummy variable for the post-Great Recession.  The 
lag of this first-differenced estate tax variable was also significant or marginally 
significant in two of these specifications.   
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Conversely, one would expect that increases in the exemption levels would 
be associated with decreases in the share of estates with charitable bequests, 
because fewer dollars would be subject to the estate tax, but we found a positive 
and significant effect, when measured as a continuous variable.  However, this 
effect was no longer statistically significant once we controlled for the effect of the 
total number of estates (differenced).  We also tested the exemption levels as a 
series of dichotomous variables and found that increases in the exemption levels at 
the lower end of the spectrum were significantly associated with increases in the 
share of estates with a charitable bequest (omitted category is exemption level less 
than $1 million in 2012 dollars).  On the other hand, the largest dummy variable 
for exemption levels ($3 million and more) was always insignificant when we 
controlled for the total number of estates (differenced).  However, when we 
omitted this variable, a larger exemption level is statistically significant and 
positively related to the share of all estates with a bequest.  This significance, 
however, was only at the 0.10 level when we included a binary variable for post-
Great Recession.  However, among all estates, the smaller ones (at least those less 
than $10 million) may dominate the effects of the smaller number of large estates.   
 
Another policy-relevant variable is the year in which there was no estate tax 
(2010), which we treated as dummy variable to isolate the effect.  Contrary to 
theory, the share of all estates with charitable bequests significantly increased 
between 19 percent and 24 percent that year, depending on the specification, 
although the effect is insignificant when we also controlled for post-Great 
Recession years.  This suggests that the elimination of the estate tax triggered a 
wealth effect much greater than the tax-price effect—at least in the short run.  The 
other policy variable, changes in the top marginal personal income tax rate 
(differenced) and its squared value have no significant effect in any of the models.  
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Personal consumption (differenced), which was our proxy for permanent income, 
is insignificant at traditional levels in all models.  Its squared values is always 
insignificant.  The S&P500 (differenced) is insignificant along with its square.  All 
pre-Great Recession recessions and the Great Recession variables were statistically 
insignificant.   
 
In the models in which we included the predictors of corporate giving to examine 
whether there were indirect linkages between corporate giving variables and 
charitable bequest giving, most of these variables are statistically insignificant: 
corporate income (differenced) and lagged corporate income (differenced)  were 
always insignificant.  GDP (differenced) and lagged GDP (differenced) are usually 
insignificant, but in one of the models, GDP (differenced) has a very small but 
marginally significant (p < 0.10) and positive effect on the share of estates with a 
charitable bequest.   
 
We also included a variable as a control variable that simply measures the total 
number of estates (differenced from year to year).  The theoretical motivation for 
including this variable is the notion that there may be diminishing returns to the 
share of bequest formation if there were increases in the number of estates in any 
given year.  For example, one would expect that if there were a large increase in 
the number of estates in any given year that most of them would be smaller estates 
rather than larger estates.  Similarly, one would expect that smaller estates would 
be less likely to include a charitable bequest.  Our results are consistent with this 
theory: while the coefficient on this variable is quite small, it is consistently 
negative and statistically significant in the models where exemption levels are 
operationalized as binary variables.  It is negative and marginally significant in the 
model where exemption levels are a continuous variable (differenced) and that 
includes a dummy variable for the Great Recession.   
 
While many of the independent variables have little or no statistical significance on 
their own, collectively they do.  These models explain between 79 percent and 98 
percent of the variation in the data.   
 
Charitable bequests among estates of $10 million (or more) as a share of the 
number of estates:  The results of our analysis on the share of all wealthy estates 
with a charitable bequest are in Table 4.  Among the estates of $10 million or 
more, the public policy variables are often statistically significant and of the 
expected sign.  Although the top estate tax rate (differenced) is always 
insignificant, the lag of this differenced variable is often negative and statistically 
significant.   
14 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The estate tax exemption levels when specified as either a set of dichotomous 
variables or a continuous variable are almost always negative and statistically 
significant.  This is also consistent with theory: increases in exemption levels 
would decrease the number of estates subject to any estate tax, and would reduce 
the amount of tax liability for those estates with any tax liability.  Therefore, fewer 
estates would seek charitable bequest gifts as an estate tax minimizing strategy.  Of 
course, that is not the only reason people leave charitable bequests, but the tax 
consequences do matter to some.  We found no statistically significant effect when 
we controlled for the year in which there was no estate tax (2010). 
 
In addition, changes in the top personal income tax rate (differenced) were positive 
and statistically significant in several of the models.  However, the squared value 
of this variable was negative and significant, consistent with diminishing returns.  
This suggests that at least some households are paying careful attention to 
decisions about current taxes (personal income taxes) and future taxes (estate 
taxes) in deciding whether or not to create a charitable bequest.  
 
Several of the explanatory variables were insignificant including: personal 
consumption (differenced), and its square, the S&P500 (differenced) and its 
square.  Corporate Income (differenced) was significant or marginally significant 
(p < 0.10) in two of the models that used dummy variables for exemption levels.  
However, the lag of differenced Corporate Income was always negative and 
significant.  Increases in the top marginal tax rate for corporations were associated 
with a significant decline in the share of wealthy estates with charitable bequests in 
most models.  These results tended to be persistent as the lags of these variables 
were also negative and significant.   
 
Recessions before the Great Recession were always insignificant as well.  The 
Great Recession is associated with a small but negative effect on the likelihood of 
large estates creating charitable bequests in the models that operationalized 
exemption levels as a continuous variable.  However, this effect only approaches 
traditional levels of significance (p<0.1).  The fact that GDP (differenced) and 
Corporate Income (differenced) tended to be insignificant suggests a weak 
relationship, if any, between these variables and bequest formations among large 
estates.  The fact that the lagged differences of Corporate Income are negative and 
quite small suggests that even when Corporate Income is statistically significant, 
the relationship is curvilinear but quite weak.   
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The number of total estates (differenced) never attains significance at traditional 
levels of significance. Intuitively, this makes sense: in the models looking at the 
share of all estates, the number of estates may matter (likely because of 
diminishing returns), but in testing only large estates, the number of all estates is 
not likely to impact the share of large estates, especially those with a bequest gift.   
 
The R-squared values from these models moved in a relatively narrow range from 
0.83 to 0.97, which suggests that the models explain the majority of the variation in 
the data and in most of the specifications, over 90 percent of the variation is 
captured by the models. 
  
Charitable bequests as share of estate wealth in all estates:  The results for the 
analysis on the share of bequests of all estate wealth are found in Table 5.  When 
examining charitable estates as a share of wealth in the estate, the effect of changes 
in the top marginal estate tax rate is effectively zero.  The coefficient on the 
variable is quite small and never attains significance, although the lag of this 
variable attains marginal significance (p < 0.10) in two specifications.  The year in 
which there was no estate tax (2010) is also insignificant. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
On the other hand, for increases in the exemption level, one would expect to have a 
negative impact on the share of wealth going to charitable bequests, yet we find a 
small but statistically significant and positive effect in this statistical relationship in 
some of the specifications, including one specification that treats exemption levels 
as a continuous (differenced) variable and two specifications when we measured 
the exemptions as a set of dichotomous variables.  Note that when we used the 
dummy variables, only the largest exemption level attained statistical significance. 
The other policy-relevant variables are changes in the top marginal rate for 
personal income taxes as well as corporate income tax rates, but these variables 
(differenced) and their squares are always insignificant.   
 
Changes in personal consumption (differenced) was only positive and marginally 
significant (p < 0.10) in two specifications, while its square value is always 
insignificant. Perhaps of interest: recessions before the Great Recession tended to 
have a small, but positive and significant effect on bequests. Similarly, the Great 
Recession had a small, but positive and significant effect on the share of wealth 
going to charitable bequests, although the post-Great Recession effect was 
insignificant. 
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Several variables are statistically insignificant a traditional levels of significance 
including the following: personal consumption (differenced), and its square;   the 
S&P500 (differenced), and its square; GDP (differenced) and its lag; corporate 
income (differenced) and its lag. The models explain between 51 percent and 93 
percent of the variation in the data.  The models using dummy variables for the 
exemption levels were always stronger models than using the continuous variable.    
 
Charitable bequests among estates of $10 million (or more) as a share of 
wealth:  We repeated the analysis of the share of estate wealth that went to 
charitable bequests among estates of $10 million or more, as seen in Table 6.  
Perhaps the most fascinating result here is that none of the direct, policy relevant 
variables are statistically significant.  For example, the estate tax rate (differenced) 
is insignificant, as its lag.  Also, the estate tax exemption levels are always 
insignificant—whether measured as a continuous variable or as a set of 
dichotomous variables. Even the year in which there was no estate tax had no 
significant effect on the share of wealth left as charitable bequests by the largest 
estates (those at $10 million or more).  The top marginal personal income tax rate 
for individuals (differenced) and its square were also insignificant. Ditto for 
corporate income tax rates and its lag.     
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Among our control variables, increases in personal consumption (differenced), 
which is our measure of permanent income, is positive and significantly associated 
with increases in the share of wealth among large estates going to a charitable 
bequest in two specifications and is marginally significant (p < 0.10) in two other 
specifications.  The square of personal consumption (differenced) is negative and 
marginally significant (p < 0.10) in one specification, suggesting that there may be 
diminishing returns at least with respect to the shares of the estate left for 
charitable bequests.    
 
The S&P500 (differenced) and its square are always statistically insignificant, as 
are GDP (differenced) and its square as well as corporate income (differenced) and 
its square.  Recessions prior to the Great Recession are positive and significant in 
one specification and marginally significant (p < 0.10) in three specifications. 
Similarly, the Great Recession itself is associated with a marginally significant (p < 
0.10) increase in the share of wealth that is contributed in the form of a charitable 
bequest among the larger estates ($10 million or more).  This suggests that the high 
net worth households in the US may have been “paying it forward” when it came 
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time to revise their wills during the Great Recession.  Alternatively, they may have 
reallocated their giving during life to their estate giving.   
 
Based on the R-squared values, our models explained between 40 and 87 percent 
of the variation in the data.  This seems remarkably high given the nature of the 
data and the complexity in the tax-philanthropy decisions.  The models using 
dichotomous measures of the exemption levels did a better job of explain the 
variation in the data than did those using a continuous measure of exemption 
levels.   
 
Conclusions 
 
At a macro level and without using any statistical controls, we have seen that total 
amount of charitable bequests given has varied quite a bit over the last 30 years.  
Bequest giving has both increased and decreased during periods of stable marginal 
tax rates, as well as constant exemption levels.  Similarly, the share of wealth in all 
estates and in large estates ($10 million or more) has trended up slightly over the 
past three decades, but there has been fairly large year-to-year variation in these 
measures, especially among the larger estates.  Likewise, the total number of 
estates with bequests seems to vary more with the business cycle than with the top 
marginal tax rates.  The number of large estates with charitable bequests has 
trended in the same direction as changes in the top marginal tax rate for the last 
thirty years—except for the abnormalities caused by the repeal of the estate tax in 
2010.   
 
On the other hand, once we introduce statistical controls, we find that the policy 
variables do matter.  For example, we find that controlling for other economic 
factors statistically, increases in the marginal estate tax rate is typically statistically 
significantly associated with increased dollars amounts bequeathed annually and 
the share of all estates that have a charitable bequest, when exemption levels are 
operationalized as dummy variables.. However, changes in the top marginal estate 
tax rate do not explain the share of wealthy estates with bequests, the share of 
wealth left in all estates as bequest gifts nor the share of very large estates left as 
bequests.   
 
In 2010, when there was no estate tax, we might have expected that bequest gifts 
would plummet because the price of the gift rose dramatically.  However, we find 
evidence that after controlling for other economic variables statistically, the dollars 
in bequest gifts increased significantly and the percentage of all estates with a 
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bequest gift increased, when we also did not control for post-Great Recession 
years. 
 
Estate tax exemptions, which is another key policy variable, seemed not to matter 
at all when looking at our graphs, yet exemptions were important in many of the 
time-series regression models, particularly when exemption levels were 
operationalized as dummy variables.  However, it did not matter in explaining the 
share of wealth left in bequests amongst the largest estates ($10 million or more).  
Intuitively, that makes sense as these larger estates are much less affected by the 
exemption levels.  That said, the exemption levels affected different dependent 
variables differently.  They had a negative impact on the total dollar amounts 
bequeathed and on the percentage of large estates with any bequests, but they had a 
positive effect on the percentage of any estates with a bequest and the share of 
wealth left as a bequest amongst all estates.   
 
The final public policy variable we tested was the top marginal tax rate on personal 
income (differenced).  The top personal income tax rate had no statistically 
significant association with either dollars bequeathed or the share of all estates 
with a charitable bequest.  However, we found evidence that changes in the top 
personal income tax rate were statistically significantly associated with increases in 
the share of the largest estates ($10 million or more) leaving a charitable bequest, 
although this effect appears to be non-linear since the square of this differenced 
variable tended to be negative and significant. This suggests that increases in the 
top marginal tax rates on households encouraged some households, and especially 
those with large expected estates, to structure their wills to include a charitable 
bequest.  However, we did not find evidence that the top personal income tax rate 
significantly affected the share of total wealth left for all estates nor for the largest 
estates ($10 million or more). 
 
The Great Recession tended not to affect the total amount of charitable bequests, 
but there are some interesting nuances.  There was very limited evidence that it had 
a negative effect on the share of large estates leaving a bequest.  However, we 
some evidence that the Great Recession is associated with increased shares of 
estate wealth left as a bequest gift for all estates and for large estates ($10 million 
or more), although the evidence for large estates is weaker.   
 
Charitable bequest giving occurs for many reasons.  Our data show that the public 
policy variables matter, but they are clearly not the only factors that matter.  
Contemporaneous measures of income and wealth are not great predictors of 
charitable bequest giving either.  This is likely caused by the fact that the decision 
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to make a charitable bequest is based on accumulated wealth and not the income or 
wealth holdings in any one given year.  Our data also suggest that public policy 
makers should carefully consider the interaction effects between personal income 
tax rates, estate tax rates, estate tax exemption levels, and charitable bequest 
giving.  It is clear that some households carefully balance current and future 
(estate) tax rates when planning current and future (estate) giving. 
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